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Exiling the Poor: The Clash of
Redevelopment and Fair Housing in
Post-Katrina New Orleans
JUDITH BROWNE-DIANIS AND ANITA SINHA*
INTRODUCTION
"Katrina was a tragedy, but its aftermath presents the most exciting
urban opportunity since San Francisco in 1906. Pioneers, please
apply.'1
Hurricane Katrina caused a crisis of a magnitude never before
seen on U.S. soil. With thousands dead and hundreds of thousands
displaced,2 policymakers swiftly presented the tragedy as an opportu-
nity for New Orleans. However, the critical inquiries are: an opportu-
nity for whom?; and what is the government's responsibility to ensure
that low-income residents are afforded a viable right to return?
Prior to Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans was a city mired in in-
equitable opportunities. The city had one of the highest levels of in-
come inequality in the United States,3 and the stark disparities in
economic and social opportunities were demarcated along racial lines.
According to a 2000 report, 88% of those living in subsidized housing
* Judith Browne-Dianis is co-director and Anita Sinha is a staff attorney at Advancement
Project, a communications and legal action organization committed to racial justice. They, along
with Bill Quigley, Tracie Washington, Judson Mitchell, and Jenner & Block, are counsel in An-
derson v. Jackson, a lawsuit brought by New Orleans public housing residents who were dis-
placed after Hurricane Katrina. The authors would like to thank the residents and the Anderson
legal team who have fought tirelessly, and often thanklessly, for the preservation of affordable
housing in New Orleans. The authors also would like to thank Jill Tauber, Skadden Fellow at
Advancement Project, for her research assistance.
1. James K. Glassman, Back to the Future, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2006, available at http://
opinionjournal.com/cc/?id=110007798.
2. Rebecca Eaton, Escape Denied: The Gretna Bridge and the Government's Armed Block-
ade in the Wake of Katrina, 13 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 127, 128-29 (2006).
3. Id. at 132.
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in New Orleans were African American,4 and 56.5% of all African
Americans were of very low income, compared to 30.9% of Whites.5
The city's public infrastructure was in dire need of reform, as the
schools, hospitals, and housing accessible to low-income residents -
predominately people of color - were notoriously underperforming. 6
Pre-Katrina New Orleans was a prime example of structural ra-
cism - how institutional mechanisms cause racial exclusion.7 The con-
sequence of this structural racism was exposed as the world watched
the botched evacuation, relief, and recovery efforts. The television
images confirmed what the post-Katrina studies found: the hurricane
had "a substantial disproportionate impact on African Americans and
people with fewer resources."' There was a direct relationship be-
tween social stratification and hurricane evacuation, as "income-level,
age, access to information, access to private transportation, physical
mobility and health .... occupations[,] . . .and .. .social networks
outside of the city" impacted evacuation strategies and subsequent ex-
periences of displacement.9 Furthermore, the devastation traced long-
4. Andrew A. Beveridge, Ph.D., The Impact on Low-Income African Americans of the
Planned Demolition of Public Housing in New Orleans, Louisiana and the Redevelopment of the
Sites, June 13, 2007, at 7 (on file with authors).
5. Id. at 9.
6. NAOMI KLEIN, THE SHOCK DOCTRINE: THE RISE OF DISASTER CAPITALISM 407-08
(2007).
7. See Peter Edelman, Where Race Meets Class: The 21st Century Civil Rights Agenda, 12
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 1, 1 (2005) ("[S]tructural racism ... [is] the racially disparate
outcomes that occur in schooling, employment, housing, the criminal justice system, and else-
where, and that, among other things, exacerbate the disproportionate poverty experienced by
people of color."); Scott C. Idleman, Multiculturalism and the Future of Tribal Sovereignty, 35
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 589, 595 (2004) ("[T]he notion of institutionally imbedded or struc-
tural racism ... [is] the idea that seemingly neutral policies or practices, and even entire institu-
tions or systems, might be designed in ways that naturally and effectively (though perhaps
unintentionally) disadvantage certain groups."); Penda D. Hair, Louder Than Words: Lawyers,
Communities and the Struggle for Justice, at 9, n.3 (March 2001), available at http://advancement
project.org/publications/community-lawyering.php ("[S]tructural exclusion refers to subtle and
overt forms of racial disadvantage and prejudice including market political and social mecha-
nisms..."); see also Andrew Grant-Thomas & john a. powell, Toward a Structural Racism Frame-
work, Poverty & Race Research Action Council (Nov./Dec. 2006), available at http://www.prrac.
org/ful-text.php?text-id=1095&item-id=10188&newsletter-id=90&header=Symposium:%20
Structural%20Racism ("[Sitructural racism ... emphasizes the powerful impact of inter-institu-
tional dynamics, institutional resource inequities, and historical legacies on racial inequalities
today.").
8. John Logan, The Impact of Katrina: Race and Class in Storm-Damaged Neighborhoods,
BROWN UNIV., at 14, http://www.s4.brown.edu/Katrina/report.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2008); see
also Sherrie Armstrong Tomlinson, No New Orleanians Left Behind: An Examination of the
Disparate Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Minorities, 38 CONN. L. REV. 1153 (2006).
9. See Eaton, supra note 2, at 133 (quoting Elizabeth Fussell, Leaving New Orleans: Social
Stratification, Networks, and Hurricane Evacuation, Soc. Sc. RES. COUNCIL, Sept. 26, 2005).
When Katrina hit New Orleans, approximately 28% of the residents lived below the poverty
level, almost 12% were over the age of 65, and about 27% had a car. Id. at 132. While the
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standing disparities in neighborhood investments that disadvantaged
Black and poor communities.1" As a result, a staggering number of
those displaced from Orleans Parish - approximately 272,000 people
or 73% of all those displaced in the parish - were African American." a
The hurricane did in fact present an opportunity - a chance to
create a city of equitable opportunity. But the redevelopment plans
devised after Katrina have maintained the status quo and have cut off
opportunities for thousands of families to return. Statements of the
city's elite foreshadowed these plans. Within days of Hurricane Ka-
trina, prominent New Orleans business leaders invited Mayor C. Ray
Nagin to a meeting to plan for New Orleans' future. Among those
leaders was James Reiss, an influential business leader and chairman
of the city's Regional Transit Authority, who reportedly stated that
New Orleans needed better services and fewer poor people. Reiss
explained, "[t]hose who want to see this city rebuilt want to see it
done in a completely different way: demographically, geographically
and politically. I'm not just speaking for myself here. The way we've
been living is not going to happen again, or we're out."t "
Similar statements made by government officials followed. Con-
gressman Richard Baker proclaimed, "[w]e finally cleaned up public
housing in New Orleans. We couldn't do it, but God did."13 Likewise,
former New Orleans City Council President Oliver Thomas acknowl-
edged that he was addressing African Americans when he said that
New Orleans did not need "soap opera watchers" to return to the
residents in the damaged areas were 75% Black and 29.2% poor, in the undamaged areas they
were 46.2% Black and 24.7% poor. See Logan, supra note 8, at 7.
10. See Logan, supra note 8, at 14.
11. Letter from the Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Action Center to Ainars Rodins,
Department of Housing and Urban Development, RE: New Orleans Housing Authority's Appli-
cations for the Demolition or Disposition of Units in New Orleans, Sept. 12, 2007 [hereinafter
Letter to Ainars Rodins] (on file with authors).
12. Christopher Cooper, Old Line Families Escape Worst of Flood and Plot the Future,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 2005, available at http://www.commondreams.org/headlines05/0908-09.htm.
13. Charles Babington, Some GOP Legislators Hit Jarring Notes in Addressing Katrina,
WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2005, at A04. See also Eaton, supra note 2, at 136 (citing Barbara Bush,
after touring the Houston Astrodome that temporarily housed thousands of Katrina evacuees, as
stating "So many of the people here, you know, were underprivileged anyway, so this is working
very well for them;" Former House Majority Leader Tom Delay, comparing temporary housing
at the Astrodome to camp, as asking a group of boys, "Now tell me the truth, boys, is this kind of
fun?"; Former Secretary of Education as admitting that post-Katrina New Orleans was on his
mind when he said, "If you wanted to reduce crime ... you could abort every [Bilack baby in
this country and your crime rate would go down.").
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city.14 And the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Housing and Ur-
ban Development (HUD), who is charged with providing affordable
housing to and promoting economic development for disadvantaged
communities, stated that New Orleans "is not going to be as [B]lack as
it was for a long time, if ever again."15
Staying true to these statements, New Orleans' post-Katrina re-
development plans have effectively prohibited the return of low-in-
come communities of color. From health care to education to
housing, these families have found institutional barriers that prohibit
their return. As of July 2007, four out of seven general hospitals re-
mained closed, and the city had only two-thirds of its pre-Katrina hos-
pital bed capacity.' 6 After Hurricane Katrina, the government
permanently closed Charity Hospital,17 where prior to the hurricane
nearly three-quarters of the patients were African American and 85%
had income levels below $20,000.18 The education system has been
dismantled since the hurricane, with most of the public schools re-
placed by charter schools with selective admission policies and enroll-
ment caps to the exclusion of thousands of children - predominately
low-income children of color.1 9
The affordable housing plan for New Orleans most starkly dem-
onstrates that the city's redevelopment plan depends on exiling poor
14. Thomas, who is Black, said "I'm saying these things to motivate my people." Eric Ber-
ger, New Orleans Says it Won't Give Free Ride, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 22, 2006, available at http://
www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/front/3676263.html.
15. Becky Brown et al., Hurricane Rita: The Aftermath; Population Shift, Hous. CHRON.,
Sept. 29, 2005, at B1.
16. See Leslie Eaton, For New Orleans, Reviving Health Care System Will Set City's Future,
N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/23/us/24cnd-orleans.html?_r=l&hp&
oref=slogin [hereinafter Eaton, For New Orleans] ("Only one of the city's seven general hospi-
tals is operating at its pre-Katrina level; two more are partly open, and four remain closed. The
number of hospital beds in New Orleans has dropped by two-thirds."); see also Leslie Eaton,
New Orleans Recovery is Slowed by Closed Hospitals, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2007, http://www.
nytimes.com/2007/07/24/us/24orleans.html?pagewanted=l&n=Top/News/Health/Diseases,%20
Conditions,%20and%20Health%20Topics/Doctors ("Of all the factors blocking the economic
revival of New Orleans, the shattered health care system may be the most important..
17. See Eaton, For New Orleans, supra note 16.
18. Marcheta Gillam et al., After Katrina: Rebuilding a Healthy New Orleans, NEW ORLE-
ANS HEALTH DISPARITIES INITIATIVE, May 2007, at 44, available at http://www.prrac.org/pdf/
rebuild healthy nola.pdf. The Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
described New Orleans' health care system "as a two-tier system: private care for people with
insurance and the Charity hospital system for people with no coverage." Id. at 51.
19. See Bill Quigley, Experimenting on Someone Else's Children: Fighting for the Right to




people of color.20 The city's already-shrinking affordable housing
stock21 took a huge hit by Hurricane Katrina and the breach of New
Orleans' levees. Of the city's 142,000 units that were damaged or lost
in New Orleans due to Katrina, 112,000 - 79% - were affordable to
low-income housing. 2 Most of these units have not been repaired or
replaced, nor are there any plans to do so.23 In fact, the post-Katrina
redevelopment plan is to limit the construction of affordable housing.
While 53.5% of New Orleans pre-Katrina residents were renters,24
virtually none of the post-hurricane housing finance programs are
geared toward rehabilitation of rental property. Instead, the main,
multi-billion dollar program - the "Road Home Program" - assists
primarily homeowners,25 with no provision to assist renters directly. 6
After Katrina, local governments in the greater New Orleans area in-
20. Shaila Dewan, Road to New Life After Katrina is Closed to Many, N.Y. TIMES,
July 12, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/12/us/nationalspecial/12exile.html?_r
=1 &adxnnl=l &oref=slogin&adxnnlx=1203208035-KdNjkx2tvuDIwwkKVQ£Ew.
21. According to an analysis done by HUD, during the 1990s, the rental market lost almost
18,000 rental units, and more than 10,000 of these units were located in New Orleans. See Bever-
idge, supra note 4, at 7.
22. National Low Income Housing Coalition, NLIHC Estimates 71% of Units Lost in Gulf
Coast Were Low Income, Sept. 20, 2005, available at http://www.nlihc.org/detail/article.cfm?arti-
cleid=2670&id=48; see also Deon Roberts, Unaffordable Problem: N.O. Needs 30,000 Low-In-
come Rental Units, NEW ORLEANS CiTY Bus., Dec. 4, 2006, available at http://www.neworleans
citybusiness.com/viewStory.cfm?reclD=17465 (reporting that the Louisiana Hurricane Housing
Task Force in December 2006 stated that there is an "urgent need" for 45,000 affordable rental
units in Louisiana, 30,000 in New Orleans alone).
23. See Annie Clark & Kalima Rose, Bringing Louisiana Renters Home: An Evaluation of
the 2006-2007 Gulf Opportunity Zone Rental Housing Restoration Program, POLICYLINK, June
2007, at 16, www.policylink.org/documents/LRHC.pdf (reporting that Louisiana's plan for re-
pairing rental homes damaged or destroyed will replace only one-fifth of this housing).
24. See Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, Metro New Orleans Fair Market
Rent History, http://www.gnocdc.org/reports/fair_marketrents.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2008).
25. The Road Home Small Rental Property Owners program has promised conditional
awards for the rehabilitation of 9,975 "affordable" rental units. See The Road Home, http://
www.road2la.org/rentaV (last visited Mar. 23, 2008). There are two major problems with the
program. First, rents are based on the Area Median Income (AMI), with "affordable" defined
as affordable to households with as much as 80% AMI. See The Road Home, Frequent Ques-
tions, http://www.road2la.org/rental/faqs.htm#gp4 (last visited Mar. 23, 2008). Second, the pro-
gram only provides conditional partial loan forgiveness (and only after a specified period of
years if the property owner complies with all aspects of the program), and the property owner
must secure funding for repairs on their own. Id.
26. See Posting of Rachel Jordan to No Road Home, A Human Rights Weblog of the Unita-
rian Universalist Service Committee, http://www.uusc.org/blog/2007lO9/no-road-home.html
(Sept. 26, 2007, 14:30 EST) ("The Road Home Program is meant to help mostly homeowners,
leaving renters to fend for themselves. This is particularly unhelpful for a city like New Orleans,
where more than half of residents rented before the storm.") The Program did issue an "Action
Taken in Response to Public Comment" in April 2006 in a stated effort to establish a first-time
home owners program to assist low to moderate income renters, see http:l/web.archive.org/web/
20061018161533/http://www.Ira.louisiana.govlassets/april26/ResponsetoPubComRH42606.pdf,
but no such program was ever created.
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troduced ordinances specifically designed to inhibit the development
of affordable housing27 and limit access to existing properties on the
basis of race.28 Additionally, the City of New Orleans pursued an ag-
gressive demolition program primarily applied to low-income
neighborhoods."29
With a dearth of affordable housing, post-Katrina rental rates are
at least 40% higher than pre-storm rates. 30 About one-third of New
Orleans' pre-Katrina residents, predominantly those in need of afford-
able housing, remain in temporary housing scattered across the coun-
try.3' The number of those homeless in New Orleans has doubled
since the storm, to approximately 12,000.32 These statistics show that
the post-Katrina redevelopment plan clearly has not fixed the inequi-
ties that pre-existed the storm, but instead has wiped out the infra-
structure that would allow low-income communities of color to return.
As Naomi Klein observed of the government's actions after the hurri-
cane: "New Orleans' public sphere was not being rebuilt, it was being
erased, with the storm used as the excuse.
33
This article will examine the government's post-Katrina actions
with respect to New Orleans public housing. Most of the city's public
housing has been kept shut since the hurricane, and an imperative to
integrate the housing is being used to justify a plan to demolish most
27. Elected officials in both Orleans and Tammany Parishes promoted efforts to restrict
construction or redevelopment of multi-family housing. See knowledgeplex.com, http://www.
knowledgeplex.org/news/76901.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2008); see also NOLA.com, Zoning
Commission Recommendation Would Block Apartment Complex, http:/lwww.nola.comlnewslogs/
tpupdates/index.ssf?/mtlogslnola-tpupdatesarchives2006_11_27.html#208752 (last visited Feb.
15, 2008).
28. St. Bernard Parish, for example, passed an ordinance requiring property owners to rent
only to blood relatives, and because parish property is overwhelmingly owned by Whites, the law
would effectively prohibit African Americans from renting property. See Press Release, Law-
yer's Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Fair Housing Advocates Seek to Halt Discriminatory
Zoning Rule (Nov. 2, 2006), available at http://www.lawyerscomm.org/2005website/publications/
press/pressl10206.html [hereinafter Fair Housing Advocates].
29. The addresses listed for demolition in the Good Neighbor Plan, now referred to as "Im-
minent Health Threats Properties," are overwhelmingly in lower-income neighborhoods of
color. See City of New Orleans, http://cityofno.com/portal.aspx?tabid=118 and http://cityofno.
com/portal.aspx?tabid=120 (last visited Feb. 15, 2008).
30. Amy Liu & Allison Plyer, The New Orleans Index: A Review of Key Indicators of Re-
covery Two Years After Katrina, THE NEW ORLEANS INDEX, at 6, http://www.gnocdc.org/NOLA
Index/ESNOLAIndexAug07.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2008).
31. According to November 2007 statistics based on households actively receiving mail,
New Orleans population reached about seventy percent its pre-Katrina level. See Greater New
Orleans Community Data Center, November 2007 New Orleans Population Growth May Have
Begun to Slow, Jan. 15, 2008, http://www.gnocdc.org/media/GNOCDCJanl5-08.pdf.
32. Brad Heath, Katrina's Wrath Lingers for New Orleans' Poor, USA TODAY, Dec. 13,
2007, available at http:l/www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-12-13-katrinapoorN.htm.
33. KLEIN, supra note 6, at 415.
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public housing and replace the razed units with far fewer public hous-
ing homes. This article will discuss how the post-Katrina plan for pub-
lic housing in New Orleans constitutes an eradication of the buildings
and families who lived in them, demonstrating that the "opportunity"
created by the storm is not for the city's low-income residents of color.
It also addresses how the government's plans for New Orleans' public
housing violate Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 - the Fair
Housing Act. The prolonged and likely permanent displacement of
thousands of public housing families, despite the laws that should have
provided for their right to return home, provides a solemn, stark les-
son that housing advocates must heed. That these homes have not
been saved serves as a call to take back the Fair Housing Act from the
government agents and policymakers who have skewed the statute's
purpose to provide housing opportunities for protected groups for
whom the housing market does not provide genuinely open housing.
Part I outlines the post-Katrina policies regarding New Orleans'
public housing. Part II examines the legal standards of the Fair Hous-
ing Act that required HUD and the Housing Authority of New Orle-
ans (HANO) to take into account both the discriminatory effect of its
actions on African Americans and the dearth of housing opportunities
for this population. Part III demonstrates the inability of the New
Orleans private housing market to provide housing opportunities to
displaced residents, and highlights generally the shortfall of vouchers
insofar as providing actual housing choices. Part IV urges that the
lessons from the post-Katrina New Orleans public housing travesty be
utilized to revitalize the core purpose of the Fair Housing Act - to
ensure housing opportunities to communities that face discrimination
in the market. Finally, this article, in telling the tragic story of New
Orleans public housing after Hurricane Katrina, calls for a reconcep-
tualization of fair housing policy so that policies intended to benefit
poor families are not employed to the detriment of African-American
families and their communities.
I. NEW ORLEANS PUBLIC HOUSING:
A HUMAN-MADE DISASTER
A. HUD, Not the Hurricane, Destroyed Public Housing
Prior to Hurricane Katrina, HUD recognized that "[t]he need for
additional public and affordable housing in the New Orleans commu-
2008]
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nity is at crisis proportions."34 But HUD's actions betrayed its own
assessment. In 1996, there were more than 13,500 public housing units
in New Orleans. At the time of Hurricane Katrina's landfall, there
were only 5,146 families living in public housing,35 all of whom were
African American.36 Two thousand additional units were kept vacant
for years, purportedly awaiting demolition,37 while the demand for
public housing greatly outstripped supply with more people on waiting
lists for public housing and rental assistance than in public housing or
receiving rental assistance.38 Despite the significant need for afforda-
ble housing in the years preceding Hurricane Katrina, HUD and
HANO were downsizing the city's low-income population by shrink-
ing the public housing stock.
After Hurricane Katrina, Congress directed HUD to preserve, to
the extent possible, all public housing in areas affected by the storm.39
According to HUD's own post-Katrina assessments of the public
housing stock in New Orleans, many units could have been preserved
with some repairs.4" But instead of reopening these units, HUD and
HANO shut down most of the city's public housing, securing some
developments with fences and razor wire, and installing shutters over
the windows and doors of others.4 Despite Congress' mandate, HUD
34. U.S. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., PHA Plans: Annual Plan for Fiscal Year 2003, at
6, available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/pha/approved/pdf/02/laOOlvO3.pdf.
35. Housing Authority of New Orleans Post-Katrina Frequently Asked Questions, http://
www.HANO.org/FAQ072006.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2008).
36. Id.
37. In 2002, HUD placed HANO in receivership. As a result, through its management
team, HUD is responsible for managing the day-to-day operations of the housing authority,
including HANO's redevelopment plans. This Article, therefore, will make reference to HUD
and HANO and HUD only interchangeably.
38. More than 16,000 families that applied for public housing were placed on a waiting list,
and many additional families were not even able to get placed on the waiting list at all. And
when the waiting list for Section 8 vouchers was opened in 2001, HANO received 19,000 applica-
tions and then closed the list to new applicants. HANO Annual Plan for Fiscal Year Beginning
10/2003, at 7-9, available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/pha/approved/pdf/03/IaOOlv0l.pdf.
39. Act of Dec. 30, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148; 119 Stat. 2781 (2006).
40. Housing Authority of New Orleans Post-Katrina Frequently Asked Questions, Exhibit
B in Senate Banking Committee Testimony, available at http://www.hano.org, Apr. 2006. (on file
with authors). Even in the cases of those units with some severe damage, the presence of dam-
age often was restricted to first floors, not upper floors where the flooding did not reach. See
Bill Sasser, Locking Out New Orleans' Poor, SALON.COM, June 12, 2006, http://www.salon.com/
news/feature/2006/06/12/nola-housing/index np.html.
41. See Susan Saulny, Residents Clamoring to Come Home to New Orleans Projects, N.Y.
TIMES, June 6, 2006, at A14; Anne Rochell Konigsmark, New Orleans Public-Housing Plan Set,
USA TODAY, June 14, 2006, at 3A; Robert Little, Barred From Coming Home: New Orleans
Poor Are Shut Out of Public Housing, BALT. SUN, Feb. 19, 2006, at 1A.
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failed to perform even basic maintenance to many units that suffered
little or no damage. n2
Meanwhile, public housing residents expected to return home
with the city's other residents when the mandatory evacuation was
lifted six weeks after Katrina struck. Instead, they found themselves
shut out of their homes and scattered across the country. As displaced
persons, many encountered stigmatization and discrimination. Many
were unable to find employment in their new cities, and the Bureau of
Labor Statistics estimated that the unemployment rate for Hurricane
Katrina evacuees who remained displaced was triple that of those who
had returned. 3 Most were falling deeper into poverty as they strug-
gled to pay utilities and other expenses they did not have prior to the
storm. In addition to the trauma they underwent in the days and
weeks after Katrina, displaced residents suffered - and many continue
to endure - the strain of displacement.4 4
With more than 4,000 habitable public housing units sitting va-
cant and families remaining desperate and displaced, the government
finally began unveiling its plan for New Orleans' public housing. In
April 2006, HUD characterized one of the developments, C.J. Peete,
which had sustained minimal interior damage and little overall dam-
age, as "a prime location for retail and residential development."45
Redevelopment plans for the Treme District, a historically Black
neighborhood, were revealed with the announcement of a $130-mil-
lion movie studio that was going to be built on land abutting the
Lafitte public housing development.4 6 Then on June 14, 2006, HUD
Secretary Alphonso Jackson announced a plan to demolish four of
New Orleans' largest developments - C.J. Peete, Lafitte, B.W.
42. In fact, after Hurricane Katrina HANO laid off a number of staff. Ed Anderson,
HANO Letting 113 Staffers Go, TIMES-PICAYUNE, July 20, 2006, at 1.
43. See Katy Reckdahl, Razing a Community: Second in a two-part series, GAMBIT WKLY,
Oct. 31, 2006, available at http://www.bestofneworleans.com/dispatch/2006-10-31/news-feat.php;
see also Dewan, supra note 20, at 5 (reporting that according to a February 2007 survey, one-
third of Katrina evacuees living in Houston were still looking for work).
44. For a thorough discussion of the deleterious impact of displacement and community
dismemberment, see MINDY THOMPSON FULLILOVE, ROOT SHOCK: How TEARING UP CITY
NEIGHBORHOODS HURTS AMERICA, AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT (2004).
45. HANO Preliminary Recovery Plan, C.J. Peete Housing Development (Apr. 24, 2006) (on
file with authors).
46. Deon Roberts, Plans to build $130M Movie Studio Near New Orleans Housing Develop-




Cooper, and St. Bernard - with more than 5,000 units among them.4 7
The plan proposes the largest demolition in the city's history," de-
stroying more than 70% of New Orleans public housing stock.4 9
HUD's plan was predicated on the fact that the housing develop-
ments were perched on prime real estate that would be central to New
Orleans' redevelopment - as long as poor people were no longer liv-
ing there. Public housing had become fodder for the economic revival
of the city.
B. The Demolition of New Orleans Public Housing Presented an
Opportunity, But Not for the Displaced Families
HUD rationalized its decision to raze thousands of public housing
units by claiming that the buildings had sustained significant dam-
age,50 contradicting its prior assessments that some of these units suf-
fered only minor water damage and many could be habitable again
once repaired. However, an inspection of the buildings by John E.
Fernandez from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology found no
structural or nonstructural damage to reasonably warrant demolition.
Professor Fernandez concluded: "[j]ustifications for demolition on the
grounds that these buildings can no longer function as safe and hu-
mane housing for the people of New Orleans are not credible."
5 1
HUD offered another reason for its plan: Hurricane Katrina pro-
vided an opportunity to build better housing than "massive, stacked
housing projects. '52 However, HUD's assertion that the construction
of the buildings warrants destruction was suspect:
[HUD's] argument seems strangely disingenuous in New Orleans
.... Built at the height of the New Deal, [New Orleans'] public
47. See Press Release, HUD Outlines Aggressive Plan to Bring Families Back to New Orle-
ans' Public Housing (June 14, 2006), available at http://www.hud.gov/news/release.cfm?content=
pr06-066.cfm.
48. Susan Saulny, 5,000 Public Housing Units in New Orleans Are to Be Razed, N.Y. TIMES,
June 15, 2006, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/15/us/15housing.html?ex=1308
024000&en=7e1599e4112fed5d&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&.
49. See Beveridge, supra note 4, at 16. In the wake of HUD's June 14, 2006, Advancement
Project along with co-counsel Bill Quigley, Tracie Washington, Judson Mitchell, and Jenner &
Block filed a lawsuit, Anderson v. Jackson, No. 06-3298, slip op. (E.D. La. Dec. 14, 2007), on
behalf of displaced public housing residents against HUD and HANO.
50. Gwen Filosa, Four N.O. Housing Developments Will Be Demolished, TIMES-PICAYUNE,
June 15, 2006, available at http://www.nola.comlnews/t-p/frontpage/index.ssf?base/news-5/11503
56990188590.xml&coll=l.
51. Expert Report of John Emmanuel Fernandez, Professor, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, at 5 (on file with authors).
52. Alphonso Jackson, Post-Katrina Progress Housing to Help End Suffering, WASH. TIMES,
Dec. 27, 2007, at A15.
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housing projects have little in common with the dehumanizing
superblocks and grim plazas that have long been an emblem of ur-
ban poverty. Modestly scaled, they include some of the best public
housing built in the United States.53
In the continuation of its demolition-as-opportunity argument,
HUD claimed that razing the units will "give thousands of families a
fresh start. ' 54 But this notion is premised upon a wholesale denial of
neighborhood history and social networks, rendering "the vague no-
tion of a 'fresh start' [an invocation] to justify erasing entire
communities.
55
Official statements and the plan for New Orleans' public housing
reveal that the real opportunity being pursued is a new city for the
rich and middle class. Soon after Hurricane Katrina, HUD Secretary
Alphonso Jackson stated that New Orleans "is not going to be as
[BIlack as it was for a long time, if ever again. "56 Secretary Jackson's
statement was far from an innocent observation - it foreshadowed the
plans for the city's public housing that he allegedly has been central in
orchestrating. The news, for example, later reported plans to build a
"state-of-the-art golf complex suitable to host PGA Tour events"
nearby the St. Bernard housing development. 57 A few months later,
the Federal Bureau of Investigations and the HUD Inspector General
launched an investigation into whether Secretary Jackson secured a
non-competitive bid contract at HANO "for a golfing buddy and so-
cial friend."58 They are also investigating the circumstances surround-
ing the contract awarded to one of the St. Bernard developers to
which the Secretary has financial ties.59
On September 21, 2007, HUD approved the demolition of most
of New Orleans' public housing and replaced the razed units with far
fewer public housing units.6" According to the disposition plan, the
53. See Nicolai Ouroussoff, All Fall Down, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2006, § 4, at 1.
54. See Jackson, supra note 52.
55. Nicolai Ouroussoff, High Noon in New Orleans: The Bulldozers Are Ready, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 19, 2007, § 4, at 1.
56. Becky Brown et al., Hurricane Rita: The Aftermath; Population Shift, Hous. CHRON.,
Sept. 29, 2005, at B1.
57. Frank Donze, Fertile Ground, TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 6, 2007, at 1.
58. Edward T. Pound, Katrina Aftermath: Questionable Contracts, NAT'L J., Oct. 4, 2007,
available at http://news.nationaljournal.com/articles/071004nj2.htm.
59. Id. See also Edward T. Pound, HUD Probe Heats Up, NAT'L J., Dec. 14, 2007, available
at http://news.nationaljournal.com/articles/071214nj1.htm.
60. Letter from Ainars Rodins, Director, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment, to Karen Cato-Turner, Executive Administrator, Housing Authority of New Orleans
(Sept. 21, 2007) (on file with authors).
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St. Bernard development, which consisted of 1,400 public housing
units, will be replaced with 595 total units, of which only 160, or 11%
of the original number of units, will be public housing units; at the C.J.
Peete development, 723 public housing units will be replaced with 410
total units, of which 154, or 21% of the original number of units, will
be public housing units; and at the B.W. Cooper development, 1,546
public housing units will be replaced by 410 total units, of which only
154, or 10% of the original number of units, will be public housing
units.61 As a result, a total of 3,201 units of housing available to very
low-income families will be lost.
The redevelopment of public housing in New Orleans serves a
broader vision of the city's post-Katrina redevelopment plan. It ac-
commodates a desire to increase New Orleans' tax base by creating
new commercial space at each of the public housing developments,
and it meets the needs of the elite who wanted to change the
demographics of New Orleans by displacing thousands of low-income,
African-American families. However, as the next Section will demon-
strate, the protections and mandates of the Fair Housing Act should
have prevented HUD and HANO from using Hurricane Katrina as an
excuse to wipe out New Orleans' public housing and exile the families
who lived there prior to the storm.
II. THE FAIR HOUSING ACT
Congress passed Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, known
as the Fair Housing Act,6" one week after the assassination of Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr., and after five successive summers of racial
unrest in cities across the United States.63 The purpose of the legisla-
tion was to facilitate a truly open society, as it declared that the policy
of the United States is to provide, within constitutional limitations, for
61. Bill Quigley, Why is HUD Using Tens of Millions in Katrina Money to Bulldoze 4,534
Public Housing Apartments in New Orleans When it Costs Less to Repair and Open Them up?: A
Tale of Two Sisters, COUNTERPUNCH, Dec. 29, 2006, http://www.counterpunch.org/quigley1229
2006.html.
62. Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, Title VIII, § 801, 82 Stat. 81 (1968)
(amended 1988).
63. John 0. Calmore, Race/ism Lost and Found: The Fair Housing Act at Thirty, 52 U.
MIAmi L. REV. 1067, 1069 (1998). See also Brian Patrick Larkin, Note, The Forty-Year "First
Step": The Fair Housing Act as an Incomplete Tool for Suburban Integration, 107 COLUM. L.
REV. 1617, 1620-24 (2007). The circumstances in which the Fair Housing Act was passed are
relevant insofar as they explain the limited legislative history that accompanies the Act.
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fair housing throughout the nation.64 The statute not only prohibits
racial discrimination in almost all sectors of housing, it also requires
all federal agencies to administer housing programs "in a manner af-
firmatively to further" fair housing.65
This Section will demonstrate how HUD's and HANO's post-Ka-
trina policies concerning public housing in New Orleans violate the
Fair Housing Act.6 6 HUD's and HANO's actions and redevelopment
plans have had a discriminatory effect on, and have severely limited
housing opportunities for, public housing residents, all of whom are
African American. HUD's plan for redevelopment of public housing
in New Orleans is, in fact, no different than the "Negro removal"
cases of the 1950s and 1960s, where African-American communities
were removed in the name of urban revitalization.67  The plan bla-
tantly violates the core purpose of the Fair Housing Act, as it limits
housing opportunities for African Americans by reducing units availa-
ble to public housing families with no concrete plan for opening op-
portunities for these families in other areas of New Orleans. The plan
effectively excludes low-income, African-American families from
post-Katrina New Orleans.
A. Discrimination Claims Under Section 3604: Disparate Impact
and Disparate Treatment
Section 3604 of the Fair Housing Act provides that it is unlawful
to "make unavailable or deny" housing "because of race."68 Discrimi-
nation under the Fair Housing Act may be proven by showing either
disparate impact or disparate treatment.69 It is well established that it
64. Calmore, supra note 63. When the Fair Housing Act was initially passed, the protected
classes were race, color, national origin, and religion. Congress extended the Act's protection to
sex, handicap, and familial status in the Fair Housing Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
430, 102 Stat. 1620 (1988).
65. Florence Roisman, Keeping the Promise: Ending Racial Discrimination and Segregation
in Federally Funded Housing, 48 How. L.J. 913, 914 (2005). Roisman notes that "[t]he 1988 Fair
Housing Amendments Act substantially strengthened the 1968 Act, and various housing and
community development statutes later explicitly extended the 'affirmatively to further' and re-
lated obligations to public housing authorities and other agencies." Id.
66. In addition to claims under the Fair Housing Act, public housing residents have addi-
tional protections under the U.S. Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437p, the Equal Protection
Clause and Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution, and the International law embodied in
the U.N. Guiding Principles on Internally Displaced Persons.
67. See generally Rigel C. Oliveri, Is Acquisition Everything? Protecting the Rights of Occu-
pants Under the Fair Housing Act, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 61 n.294 (2008).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1968).
69. See, e.g., Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 1999) ("A plaintiff can establish
a FHA discrimination claim under a theory of disparate treatment or disparate impact."); Simms
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is not necessary to show discriminatory intent to prove a claim under
Section 3604 - "[e]ffect, not motivation, is the touchstone" under the
Fair Housing Act.7 ° In the case of the closure and redevelopment of
New Orleans' public housing after Hurricane Katrina, HUD's and
HANO's actions have demonstrated both discriminatory effect and
intent.
1. Disparate Impact
Disparate impact is a critical method of proving housing discrimi-
nation as, "the arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be as disas-
trous and unfair to private rights and the public interest as the
perversity of a willful scheme."71 A prima facie case of disparate im-
pact under Section 3604 of the Fair Housing Act must demonstrate
that the policy, procedure, or practice will have or has had a signifi-
cant discriminatory effect on a protected group.72 Such a case may be
v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.2d 1546, 1555-56 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that plaintiff can establish
fair housing violation with evidence of discriminatory intent or discriminatory effects); Doe v.
City of Butler, 892 F.2d 315, 323 (3d Cir. 1989) (ruling that prima facie cases under Title VIII can
be brought with a showing of discriminatory treatment or discriminatory effect alone, without
intent); Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 574-75 (6th Cir. 1986) (finding that facially neu-
tral housing decisions can still have discriminatory effects); Phillips v. Hunter Trails Cmty. Ass'n,
685 F.2d 184, 189-90 (7th Cir. 1982) (observing that some fair housing violations arise from
discrete transactions and others have broader context, "when a facially neutral policy or action
has an unequal impact on different subgroups in the housing market"). See also Robert G.
Schwemm, Housing Discrimination Law and Litigation § 10.1 (June 2007) (In the absence of an
authoritative Supreme Court ruling on § 3604, lower courts have adopted the Title VII employ-
ment discrimination standard that discrimination may be proven by a showing of disparate im-
pact or disparate treatment.).
70. Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp., 536 F.2d 231, 233 (8th Cir. 1976); accord Huntington
Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 934-36 (2d Cir. 1988) (applying Title VII
analysis to Title VIII and ruling that plaintiff need not make any showing of discriminatory
intent for a disparate impact claim); Metro. Hous. Corp. v. Arlington Heights (Arlington Heights
11), 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977) ("We therefore hold that at least under some circum-
stances a violation of section 3604(a) can be established by a showing of discriminatory effect
without a showing of discriminatory intent."); U.S. v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th
Cir. 1974) ("The plaintiff need make no showing whatsoever that the action resulting in racial
discrimination in housing was racially motivated"). See generally Robert G. Schwemm, Housing
Discrimination Law and Litigation § 10.4 (June 2006).
71. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1185 (quoting Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 497
(D.D.C. 1967), affd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 132 U.S. App. D.C. 372, 408 F.2d 175 (1969)
(en banc)).
72. See, e.g., Simms, 83 F.3d at 1555 ("The relevant question in a discriminatory effects
claim against a private defendant . . . is whether a policy, procedure, or practice specifically
identified by the plaintiff has a significantly greater discriminatory impact on members of a pro-
tected class."); Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 826 ("where a Negro buyer meets the
objective requirements of a real estate developer so that a sale would in all likelihood have been
consummated were he [W]hite and statistics show that all of a substantial number of lots in the
development have been sold only to [Wihites, a prima facie inference of discrimination arises as
a matter of law"); Huntington, 844 F.2d at 934-36 (agreeing that prima facie case is established by
[VOL. 51:481
Exiling the Poor
made by proving either: (1) the ultimate effect of the housing decision
may be racially discriminatory because it tends to exclude a protected
group; or (2) the immediate effect of the housing decision has "a
greater adverse impact on one racial group than on another." 3
The effect analysis simply looks at whether a decision results in,
or can be predicted to result in, a disparate impact on a protected
class. For example, in a case where Black residents sued the town of
Clarkton, North Carolina, for blocking the construction of public
housing units, the Fourth Circuit found that the town's actions vio-
lated Section 3604:
The undisputed statistical picture leaves no doubt that the [B]lack
population of Bladen County was adversely affected by the termina-
tion of the housing project, as it is that population most in need of
new construction to replace substandard housing, and it is the one
with the highest percentage of presumptively eligible applicants.
74
Disparate impact is also established under Section 3604 where the
ultimate effect of a decision is to prevent a protected group from re-
siding in a city. In Rizzo I, the court found a Fair Housing Act viola-
tion when an urban renewal plan effectively removed a substantial
number of African Americans from the city.75 Similarly, a challenge
to a city's failure to provide replacement housing to low-income re-
sidents displaced by freeway construction was found to have a dispa-
rate impact in violation of the Fair Housing Act:
The ultimate effect of frustrating the [developments] is to prevent
low income minority displacees from continuing to reside in [the
city]. If affordable housing is not made available in [the city] by the
showing that challenged practice of defendant effectively results in racial discrimination); Rizzo
II, 564 F.2d at 148 ("[D]iscriminatory effect alone will, if proved, establish a Title VII prima facie
case.").
73. Arlington Heights I1, 558 F.2d at 1290 (ruling that disproportionate, but not
predominate, effect on racial minorities was unclear evidence of discriminatory effect).
74. Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir. 1982). See also Charleston
Hous. Auth. v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 419 F.3d 729 740-41 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that
effects analysis looks at whether "the objected-to action results in, or can be predicted to result
in, a disparate impact upon a protected class compared to a relevant population as a whole");
Oti Kaga, Inc. v. South Dakota Hous. Dev. Auth., 342 F.3d 871, 883-84 (8th Cir. 2003) (plaintiffs
"must show a facially neutral policy has a significant adverse impact on members of a protected
minority group").
75. See Rizzo H, 564 F.2d at 149 ("Whereas originally almost 45% of the families living in
the Whitman project area were [Bilack, by the time urban renewal clearance was completed and
the surrounding blocks reconstructed, virtually no [B]lack families were to be found in the
area."); Keith v. Volpe (Volpe 1), 618 F, Supp. 1132, 1151 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (finding that apparent
outcome of denying affordable housing developments was racially discriminatory where lack of
new housing would not only prevent non-resident minorities from moving to the city, but would
result in expulsion of current residents who were soon to be displaced).
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time they are displaced, they will have to move out of [the city]
altogether.
76
In the case of post-Katrina New Orleans, HUD's demolition and
redevelopment plans have the effect of permanently displacing a sig-
nificant number of African-American families from the city. HUD
reopened only 1,700 units of public housing, thus significantly reduc-
ing housing opportunities for both the almost 3,500 families that still
remain displaced and others in need of housing. The critical shortage
of affordable housing in New Orleans, with no plan for substantial
replacement, exacerbates the discriminatory effect of HUD's ac-
tions.77 HUD's plans for public housing in post-Katrina New Orleans
have disproportionately impacted African Americans, and the Fair
Housing Act requires the government and public housing authorities
(PHAs) to take this impact into account when rendering its decisions.
By not doing so, HUD has unlawfully denied thousands of families
the right to return and to participate in the redevelopment of their
city.
In the case of an immediate effect analysis, the benchmark Fair
Housing Act cases have held that when the group affected by an ad-
verse housing decision consists largely of minorities, the decision nec-
essarily has an adverse impact. In Rizzo 1, 95% of the group affected
by the city's failure to construct low-income housing was African
American, and the court held that the city had violated the Fair Hous-
ing Act.7 8 Arlington Heights II established that the strength of a dis-
parate impact showing is directly proportionate to what percentage of
the group is part of a protected class. Specifically, the court found
that "the argument for racial discrimination [in that case, 40%] is...
76. Volpe 1, 618 F. Supp. at 1151, affd, 858 F.2d 467.
77. See infra Section III.A. In general, at the end of 2006, less than one third of African-
American residents had returned to Orleans Parish. Press Release, National Fair Housing Alli-
ance, "Still No Home for the Holidays" for Katrina Survivors, (Dec. 22, 2006) at 5, available at
www.fhco.org/NEWS-NAFH%20No%20Hm%20for%2OKatrina%2OVictims-resource_2698618
1982853585808.pdf.
78. See Residents Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo (Rizzo 1), 425 F. Supp. 987, 1018 (E.D. Pa. 1976)
(finding that prevention of affordable housing projects had an adverse impact on African-Amer-
ican residents of Philadelphia where developments would have been "a unique opportunity for
these Blacks living in racially impacted areas of Philadelphia to live in an integrated, non-racially
impacted neighborhood"); See also Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir.
1982) ("The undisputed statistical picture leaves no doubt that the [Bilack population of Bladen
County was adversely affected by the termination of the housing project, as it is that population
most in need of new construction to replace substandard housing, and it is the one with the
highest percentage of presumptively eligible applicants.").
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not as strong as it would be if all or most of the group adversely af-
fected were nonwhite.
79
Some courts, however, have held that a prima facie disparate im-
pact case under Section 3604 requires a showing of a statistical dispar-
ity between the protected group impacted and a non-protected
group. 80 But by requiring a non-protected comparison group, these
courts are applying a disparate treatment comparison analysis, not an
effects test. Further, courts that have found no discrimination simply
because the group impacted is comprised solely of members of a pro-
tected class have turned the Fair Housing Act on its head. Indeed,
this reading of Section 3604 fails to recognize that the effect of dis-
criminatory housing practices may be the elimination of a non-pro-
tected group with which to show a statistical disparity. Take for
example a jurisdiction where there has been thirty years of segregated
housing patterns due to zoning, redlining, and racial steering. The ul-
timate effect of decades of such discriminatory housing practices is
that the residents of the area are all African American. It is antitheti-
cal to an anti-discrimination statute to thereafter deny that a discrimi-
natory practice violates Section 3604 because the impacted
community is now all Black.
In New Orleans, the 5,146 families living in public housing prior
to Hurricane Katrina were all African American.8" Structural racism
and the long legacy of discrimination in this country had much, if not
all, to do with this fact.8" The Fair Housing Act must be interpreted to
recognize the direct relationship between historical housing discrimi-
nation against African Americans and the fact that the immediate ef-
fect of a policy has a disparate impact on a group that is entirely
African American. HUD's demolition and disposition plan impacts
thousands of African American families, and it thereby necessarily
79. Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d at 1291.
80. See, e.g., Stout v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 282 F.3d 856, 860 (5th Cir. 2002) ("Ordina-
rily, a prima facie disparate impact case requires a showing of a substantial statistical disparity
between protected and non-protected [individuals]"); Darst-Webbe Tenant Assn. Bd. v. St. Louis
Hous. Auth., 299 F. Supp.2d 952, 957 (E.D. Mo. 2004) ("[T]here is no basis for the Court to find
either disparate impact or purposeful discrimination because the Plaintiffs in this case cannot be
shown to have been treated differently than any other group of similarly situated persons.");
Bryant Woods Inn v. Howard County, 911 F.Supp. 918, 939 (D. Md. 1996) ("[Wlhere only one
group or class of persons is affected by a particular decision, there is no disparity in treatment
between groups and no 'disparate impact.'").
81. New Orleans Housing Authority Residents Characteristics Report 2005-06, http://pic.
hud.gov/pic/RCRPublic/rcrha.asp (last visited Mar. 4, 2008).
82. See text accompanying supra notes 7 and 34-38.
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has an adverse impact in violation of Section 3604 of the Fair Housing
Act.
2. Disparate Treatment
Disparate treatment, or discriminatory intent, occurs when a
housing practice is motivated by considerations of race, color, religion,
sex, handicap, familial status, and national origin (i.e., one of the pro-
tected classes)., 3 Discrimination based on intentional consideration of
any of these factors is illegal, even if the practice was not motivated by
personal prejudice or racial animus.84 In determining whether official
action was taken with discriminatory intent, courts apply the standard
used in the Equal Protection context.
8 5
Evidence of discriminatory motive may be either direct or cir-
cumstantial.86 Direct evidence is defined as evidence that "proves the
existence of the fact in issue without inference or presumption."8 "
The Supreme Court in Arlington Heights held that in the absence of
direct evidence, discriminatory intent may be proven by the following
circumstantial evidence: (1) historical background of the challenged
decision; (2) specific sequence of events leading up to the decision; (3)
any procedural and substantive departures from the norm; and (4) leg-
islative or administrative history of the decision.88
In the case of the closure of public housing in New Orleans, there
is both direct and circumstantial evidence of discriminatory motive.
Shortly after Hurricane Katrina, HUD Secretary Alphonso Jackson
stated that New Orleans "is not going to be as [B]lack as it was for a
long time, if ever again."81 9 He further stated that "[o]nly the best re-
sidents should return." Secretary Jackson, who is Black, acknowl-
83. Robert G. Schwemm, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LITIGATION §10.2 (June
2007).
84. Id.
85. See U.S. v. Birmingham, 727 F.2d 560, 565-66 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821
(1984) (affirming trial court's judgment that city acted with racially discriminatory intent in vio-
lation of the Fair Housing Act when it blocked the construction of low-income housing).
86. Schwemm, supra note 83.
87. Id. (internal brackets omitted), citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 413-14 (5th ed. 1981).
88. Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-68 (1997). The deter-
mination of disparate treatment under Section 3604 "demands a sensitive inquiry into such cir-
cumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available." Id. at 266. See also Hanson v.
Veterans Admin., 800 F.2d 1381, 1388 (5th Cir. 1986) (weighing circumstantial evidence prof-
fered by the plaintiffs to show defendants' discriminatory intent against defendants' rebuttal
evidence).
89. Lori Rodriguez et al., Hurricane Rita: The Aftermath/Population Shift, Hous. CHRON.,
Sept. 29, 2005, at B1.
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edged this comment's racially suggestive nature by telling a White
reporter, "[i]f you said this, they would say you were racist."90 These
statements, made by the person responsible for ensuring equal hous-
ing opportunities, are direct evidence of discrimination. While there
may be no animus, Secretary Jackson's statements suggest that HUD
planned not only to abdicate its duty to ensure open housing choice,
but also sought to exclude residents who were not the "best."
The circumstantial evidence of discriminatory motive is ample.
Soon after Hurricane Katrina, an influential business person, the then-
president of New Orleans' City Council, and a Louisiana Congress
member all made statements to suggest that New Orleans is better off
if residents such as public housing families do not return.91 These
statements were followed by plans to replace the majority of the city's
public housing with commercial development 92 and to turn neighbor-
hoods devastated by the storm into green space.93 Thousands of fami-
lies remained displaced and tens of thousands more were in desperate
need of affordable housing in New Orleans when HUD approved a
demolition and disposition plan to raze habitable public housing units
and replace them with a tiny fraction of the original number of homes
available to very low-income residents.
B. Section 3608: Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing
Under Section 3608 of the Fair Housing Act, the federal govern-
ment has a duty to "further fair housing."94 Section 3608 imposes an
affirmative obligation, in that it requires HUD to do "more ... than
simply to refrain from discriminating itself or from purposely aiding
the discrimination of others."95 Section 3608's intent is to see "the
end[ ] of discrimination as a means toward truly opening the nation's
housing stock to persons of every race and creed."' 96 Indeed, courts
have held that the duty to affirmatively further fair housing requires
HUD to consider:
90. Bill Walsh, Only 'Best Residents' to be Allowed Back in St. Thomas Complex, TIMES-
PICAYUNE, Apr. 24, 2006, at 1.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 12-14.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46, 57.
93. See Robin Pogrebin, Rebuilding New Orleans, Post-Katrina Style, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6,
2007, § E, at 1.
94. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d) (1968).
95. NAACP v. HUD, 817 F.2d 149, 154 (1st Cir. 1987).
96. Florence Roisman, Mandates Unsatisfied: The Low Income Housing Tax Credit Pro-
gram and the Civil Rights Laws, 52 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1011, 1028 (1998).
2008]
Howard Law Journal
[T]he effect of its actions on the racial and socioeconomic composi-
tion of the surrounding area ... [T]he need for such consideration
itself implies, at a minimum an obligation to assess negatively those
aspects of a proposed cause of action that would further limit the
97supply of genuinely open housing....
The duty to affirmatively further fair housing has been character-
ized by some as having dual objectives - countering discrimination
and furthering integration in the housing market. 98 Others, however,
question the integration goal of the Fair Housing Act,99 and suggest
that even if the Act contains dual goals, the anti-discrimination pur-
pose should take precedent. 100 The latter position is supported by
Shannon v. HUD, where the Third Circuit clarified the government's
duties under Section 3608:
We [are not] suggesting that desegregation of housing is the only
goal of the national housing policy. There will be instances where a
pressing case may be made for the rebuilding of a racial ghetto. We
hold only that the agency's judgment must be an informed one; one
which weighs the alternatives and finds that the need for physical
rehabilitation or additional minority housing at a site in question
clearly outweighs the disadvantage of increasing or perpetuating ra-
cial concentration.
10 1
Cases where courts have found a violation of HUD's obligation
to further fair housing have in all instances involved agency practices
that have created and maintained racially segregated public housing
developments, including tenant assignments and selective enforce-
ment of regulations.10 2 The remedy tailored for such violations has
97. Project B.A.S.I.C. v. Kemp, 776 F. Supp. 637, 642 (D.R.I. 1991), overturned on other
grounds by Project B.A.S.I.C v. Kemp, 947 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1991). See also NAACP v. HUD,
817 F.2d 149, 156 (1st Cir. 1987) (stating that § 3608 imposes, "at a minimum, an obligation to
assess negatively those aspects of a proposed course of action that would further limit the supply
of genuinely open housing and to assess positively those aspects of a proposed course of action
that would increase the supply"); Rizzo 1, 425 F. Supp. at 1015 (discussing Congressional intent
in enacting the Fair Housing Act and obliging HUD to take affirmative action to provide for
desegregated and fair housing).
98. Roisman, supra note 96, at 1027.
99. Michael R. Tein, The Devaluation of Nonwhite Community in Remedies for Subsidized
Housing Discrimination, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1463, 1467 (1992) ("The 'anti-discrimination' goal is
explicit in the Act; the 'integration' goal has been read into it, largely through reference to the
legislative history.").
100. Id. at 1470 ("If the subsidized housing stage is to be shared by both 'anti-discrimination'
and 'integration,' the second goal must yield the spotlight to the first should they conflict.").
101. Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809, 822 (3d Cir. 1970), quoted in Ngai Pindell, Is There
Hope for HOPE VI?: Community Economic Development and Localism, 35 CONN. L. REV. 385,
427-28 (2003).
102. See, e.g., Thompson v. HUD, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9416 *7 (D. Md. Jan. 10, 2006)
(finding HUD liable for failing to promote desegregation by basing public housing decisions on
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been court-ordered desegregation. This, however, has created a "re-
medial structure that privileges integration over anti-discrimina-
tion,''a° a schema that has significant limitations. First, desegregation
of public housing has become virtually synonymous with deconcentra-
tion of poverty, which in turn has led to a massive reduction of public
housing. As a result, scores of African-American families have been
displaced by redeveloped, integrated housing sites. The goal of deseg-
regation is subsequently undermined as displaced families are simply
forced into other segregated neighborhoods as a result of discrimina-
tion in private housing markets and HUD's failure to provide assis-
tance to families pursuing such choices.
Second, an integration approach to the redevelopment of public
housing does not account for the importance of community - relation-
ships "solidified by ties providing a feeling of collective identity, self-
awareness, and affiliation.' 1°4 In fact, "[i]t is usually at the expense of
community that [B]lacks improve their housing package in integrated
settings dominated by [W]hites."' 5 Third, the focus on desegregation
and then limited integration ignores the option of nonsegregation,
which confers the right of people to remain in their neighborhood.
Non-segregation interprets fair housing not as forced relocation but as
neighborhood enrichment so as to create spatial equality.
10 6
Interpreting Section 3608 of the Fair Housing Act to be solely -
or even predominantly - an integration mandate facilitated the trav-
esty in New Orleans by legitimating the mass displacement of low-
income, African-American families. The plans pursued by HUD after
Hurricane Katrina suggest that this cookie-cutter approach to fair
small and discrete, rather than regional, geographic considerations); Young v. Pierce, 628 F.
Supp. 1037, 1047 (E.D. Tex. 1985) (holding HUD liable for violating the Fair Housing Act and
other civil rights laws where HUD had willfully ignored ongoing segregation in projects it was
funding and failed to keep records or take action to enforce the laws); Walker v. U.S. Dep't of
Hous. & Urban Dev., 734 F. Supp. 1231, 1232 (N.D. Tex 1989), rev'd in part and vacated in part,
Walker v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 912 F.2d 819, 820 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding that
HUD stalled major housing revitalization plan in a discriminatory manner by withdrawing fund-
ing); Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins., 409 U.S. 205 (1972) (granting standing to private residents to
sue landlord for housing discrimination because HUD lacks enforcement power and has limited
resources to manage all fair housing nationwide); Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 296 F.
Supp. 907 (N.D. 11. 1969) (agreeing with plaintiffs that local housing authority discriminated in
tenant assignments and site selections, perpetuating segregation).
103. Tein, supra note 99, at 1471-72.
104. John 0. Calmore, The Urban Crisis: The Kerner Commission Report Revisted, Spatial
Equality and the Kerner Commission Report: A Back-To-The-Future Essay, 71 N.C. L. REV.
1487, 1501 (1993).
105. Id. at 1505.
106. Id. at 1492, 1498.
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housing has gone too far and is applied without regard to the end
result. There is no question that HUD's plan to demolish a majority
of New Orleans' public housing and provide a fraction of replacement
units limits the supply of affordable housing in post-Katrina New Or-
leans.'0 7 HUD's plan not only limits housing choice for displaced
public housing residents in New Orleans, it effectively denies their
right to return at all.
The Fair Housing Act should not stand for the proposition that
HUD's duty under Section 3608 begins and ends with "deconcen-
trating" poverty, or that demolishing public housing structures and re-
placing them with mixed-income developments with far fewer housing
units for low-income families affirmatively furthers fair housing. De-
segregation was never meant to be a proxy for restricting housing op-
portunities for African Americans in New Orleans or anywhere
else.10 8 The government has used its obligations under Section 3608
to serve as "as political cover for ... massive reductions in the number
of housing units subsidized for community's poorest residents .. .
[and] massive reductions in poor African Americans in a post-Katrina
New Orleans."' 9
HUD's desegregation justification cannot hide the fact that its
plan in New Orleans and in cities across the country to drastically re-
duce the supply of affordable housing is unlawful under the Fair
Housing Act. In developing and approving its plan for New Orleans'
public housing, HUD should have considered discriminatory state-
ments indicating a desire to maintain displacement, city plans that ex-
clude low-income African Americans in exchange for wealthier,
Whites and commercial development plans suited for them, discrimi-
nation in the local housing market, and the lack of affordable housing
opportunities. As discussed in Part III, the dearth of affordable hous-
ing in the private market coupled with discrimination in post-Katrina
New Orleans and nationally demonstrate that the government cannot
fulfill its obligation to affirmatively further fair housing by reducing
the number of public housing units and not accounting for market
forces that deny housing opportunities for African Americans.
107. See supra text accompanying note 61.
108. See Florence Wagman Roisman, Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing in Regional
Housing Markets: The Baltimore Fair Public Housing Desegregation Litigation, 42 WAKE FOR-
EST L. REV. 333, 343 (2007).
109. Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same: In
Search of a Just Public Housing Policy Post Katrina, 81 TUL. L. REV. 1263, 1272 (2007).
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IIl. A HOUSING MARKET OF LIMITED OPPORTUNITIES
In New Orleans and in cities across the United States, HUD has
substituted actual housing opportunities with rental vouchers for a
bulk of public housing families, who invariably are displaced perma-
nently by HUD's deconcentration policies. Indeed, vouchers are pro-
scribed by statute to provide housing opportunities for public housing
residents when demolition is approved. The U.S. Housing Act of 1937
requires that before HUD can approve a demolition/disposition appli-
cation, the PHA must ensure that each displaced resident is offered
comparable housing. 110 The statute permits the PHA to provide com-
parable housing through tenant-based vouchers. However, the law re-
quires families to have successfully relocated into such housing before
the PHA is deemed to have satisfied its comparable housing man-
date."' In New Orleans and nationally, vouchers have not translated
into housing opportunities for African Americans.
A. The Non-Viability of Rental Vouchers in New Orleans
In post-Katrina New Orleans, there is a severe shortage of hous-
ing and, thus, vouchers are not a viable option for public housing fam-
ilies seeking to return to the city. Returning families and
reconstruction workers have been competing for the very limited sup-
ply of available housing.1 1 2 Rents in Orleans Parish have escalated to
rates 45% higher than pre-Katrina rates.
a1 3
Availability of affordable housing in New Orleans continues to be
severely limited. While HUD increased the value of vouchers to try
to meet the post-Katrina skyrocketing rents, there is still a shortage of
housing to accommodate the need. Additionally, vouchers do not
cover the exorbitant security deposits and utility payments residents
are expected to pay. The forecast for an increased supply of afforda-
110. 42 U.S.C. § 1437p(a)(4)(C) (1998).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 1437p(a)(4)(A)(iii)(aa).
112. On August 5, 2006, HANO itself stated: "The unprecedented level of devastation
wrought by Katrina has created a serious shortage of available housing throughout Orleans Par-
ish. Many of the smaller Section 8 landlords lost units that will probably not return to the mar-
ket any time soon. Also there was severe damage to multi-family units in the New Orleans area
- putting an even bigger strain on the housing supply.. .These conditions are adversely affecting
the rental housing market and will drastically affect HANO clients' ability to return to the City
of New Orleans." Housing Authority of New Orleans, Response to Congressional Follow-Up
Questions (Aug. 5, 2006) (on file with authors).
113. Gulf Coast Housing Recovery Act of 2007 Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 7 (2007) (statement of Amy Liu, Deputy Director, Metropolitan
Policy Program, The Brookings Institute), available at http://banking.senate.gov/-files/liu.pdf.
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ble housing is grim - two years after Katrina, the Greater New Orle-
ans Fair Action Housing Center stated that "[t]here are scarce
affordable housing units available or coming on line in the New Orle-
ans area due to local governmental efforts to curtail the development
of affordable housing."1 t4 Some public housing residents who have
returned to New Orleans have become part of the city's homeless
population, which has doubled since the hurricane to over 12,000.15
In addition to actual supply, housing opportunities in New Orle-
ans and its suburbs are curtailed by discrimination against African-
American renters. A study entitled No Home for the Holidays re-
ported that Black displaced residents seeking housing encountered
discrimination in 66% of their attempts to locate housing.16 An audit
of the New Orleans metro area rental market for housing discrimina-
tion based on race found discrimination against African Americans in
57.5% of transactions. 1 7 Such stark data means that discrimination,
combined with other barriers to housing in the New Orleans Metro
area for tenants requiring federal and other subsidies, creates "barri-
ers to housing" that are "nearly insurmountable. ' 8
Moreover, discrimination against African Americans in the par-
ishes surrounding New Orleans is significant, rendering their housing
choices in the neighborhoods just outside New Orleans similarly re-
strictive. Jefferson Parish has been described as "Louisiana's most no-
toriously racist parish." ' 9  After Hurricane Katrina, St. Bernard
Parish passed an ordinance requiring property owners to rent only to
blood relatives, and because parish property is overwhelmingly owned
by Whites, the law effectively prohibited African Americans from
renting property.12 0
114. See Letter to Ainars Rodins, supra note 11.
115. See John Moreno Gonzales, Homeless on the Rise in New Orleans, BOSTON GLOBE,
Aug. 19, 2007, available at http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2007/08/19/homeless on_
the rise in new orleans/ (According to the New Orleans Police Department spokesperson, this
surge in homelessness is "draining resources."). See also Bill Sasser, Surge in Homelessness Hits
New Orleans, THE CHRISTIAN SCL MONITOR, Mar. 28, 2007, available at http://www.csmonitor.
com2007/0328/p03s03-ussc.html.
116. Gulf Coast Housing Recovery Act of 2007 Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 7 (2007) (statement of James Perry, Executive Director, Greater
New Orleans Fair Housing Action Center and President, Louisiana Housing Alliance on behalf
of The National Low Income Housing Coalition), available at http://banking.senate.gov/-files/
perry.pdf.
117. Id. at 7.
118. Beveridge, supra note 4, at 12.
119. Eaton, supra note 2, at 134.
120. See Fair Housing Advocates, supra note 28.
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The dearth of affordable housing coupled with discrimination
against African Americans renders vouchers an utterly inadequate
way to provide housing opportunities in New Orleans for displaced
public housing residents. As such, HUD's and HANO's compliance
with the Fair Housing Act depended upon providing hard housing
units by either opening shuttered public housing apartments or creat-
ing new housing.
B. A National Crisis of Genuine Housing Choice
Nationally, and outside the context of crises like Hurricane Ka-
trina, vouchers have proven to be a very limited method of providing
housing choice. One of the reasons vouchers tend to be ineffective is
simply because there is more demand for affordable housing than
there is supply. In 1999, there was a 1.8 million gap between the avail-
able rental units affordable to households with incomes under seventy
percent of area median and the demand for these units.121 Absent
government intervention, the market simply cannot meet the demand
for affordable housing.
HUD has acknowledged this reality. In Thompson v. HUD,
where the court held that Section 3608 required HUD to actively pro-
mote regional housing opportunities for the Baltimore region's low-
income families living in federally-assisted housing, HUD recognized
that one of the "lessons learned" from its HOPE VI program 22 is that
housing vouchers are "not viable housing options" in tight housing
markets. 123 In the HOPE VI program, during the years 1993 through
1999 only 11.4% of 22,500 displaced public housing residents were
121. Note, When Hope Falls Short: HOPE VI, Accountability, and the Privatization of Public
Housing, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1488 (2003).
122. With the deterioration of public housing and the dwindling of federal financial support
for HUD, Congress created HOPE VI, a program that promotes private sector participation in
public housing financing and development. See id. at 1478-79. A 1993 annual appropriations act
established HOPE VI, and in 1998 "Congress permanently authorized HOPE VI as Section 24
of the Housing Act of 1937" with the enactment of QHWRA [the Quality Housing and Work
Responsibility Act]. Pindell, supra note 101, at 390-91. The program has been described as
"almost the only active part of public housing today." Florence Wagman Roisman, Keeping the
Promise: Ending Racial Discrimination and Segregation in Federally Funded Housing, 48 How.
L.J. 913, 922 (2005).
123. Thompson v. HUD, 348 F. Supp. 2d 398 (D. Md. 2005). HUD has recognized in its
"Best Practices" guide that "[i]n tight housing markets, or where there is a deficit in available
housing relative to demand, HOPE VI grantees should pursue a replacement housing strategy
that relies more heavily on hard public housing units." HOPE VI Best Practices and Lessons
Learned 1992-2002, published by HUD (June 14, 2002) (on file with authors).
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slated to reoccupy HOPE VI sites,'124 leaving the rest to fend for
themselves in the private market:
Residents identify numerous barriers to successful use of vouchers,
including costly credit checks and security deposits; limited search
time due to voucher expiration dates and employment; personal
problems such as relatives with criminal backgrounds; discrimina-
tion based on race, status as a public housing resident or use of a
voucher; and competition for units in better neighborhoods. Many
residents report that PHA-sponsored relocation counselors pressure
them to move to neighborhoods they consider as bad as the ones
they are leaving.
1 25
Indeed, discrimination in the housing market nationwide is perva-
sive. The use of tenant selection criteria such as employment or in-
come requirements bar many residents from using vouchers.
1 26
Whether latent or covert, discrimination in the rental market exists
today. The 2000 Housing Discrimination Study "showed continuing,
substantial discrimination" against Blacks and Latinos in the rental of
housing,127 and in rental tests conducted by HUD in 2000, Whites
were favored over Blacks 21.6% of the time and over Latinos 25.7%
of the time.128 HUD's studies "show that the rate of illegal race and
national origin discrimination in housing rental has remained virtually
constant over the past three decades.
129
In the case of New Orleans as well as nationwide, the mere issu-
ance of vouchers to public housing residents displaced by HUD's re-
development plans cannot meet HUD's obligation to affirmatively
further fair housing, because vouchers simply do not offer the housing
opportunities the statute was intended to create for African
Americans.
124. Note, supra note 121, at 1490.
125. Id. at 1490-91; see also Pindell, supra note 101, at 406 ("[Vloucher recipients have been
frustrated by obstacles to obtaining their choice in housing... rais[ing] the issue of resegregation
126. See, e.g., Walker v. HUD, No. 3:85-CV-1210-R, WL 33177466, at *31 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 6,
1997).
127. Roisman, supra note 65, at 916.
128. Robert G. Schwemm, Housing Rights Article: Why Do Landlords Still Discriminate
(And What Can Be Done About It?), 40 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 455, 456-57 (2007).
129. Id. at 458.
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IV. TOWARD A RECONCEPTUALIZATION
OF FAIR HOUSING
Segregation and racial discrimination in the U.S. housing market
continue to be widespread problems despite the enactment of the Fair
Housing Act. HUD's lackadaisical enforcement of the Fair Housing
Act in combination with its wholesale dismantling of the country's
public housing system without securing a safety net for low-income
families has restricted housing opportunities for poor families of color.
The hypocrisies of the government's interpretation of its fair housing
duties are most readily apparent in its plans for New Orleans' public
housing after Hurricane Katrina, where thousands of public housing
families have been excluded from their homes and the city, and will
remain displaced for a long time, if not forever, while HUD moves
forward with a plan to create "better" housing.
The case of New Orleans highlights a series of points that warrant
serious consideration. First, a policy should not be deemed to affirma-
tively further fair housing if its effect is to destroy families and com-
munities of color. Second, a determination of whether a plan furthers
fair housing must include an analysis of where residents who cannot
return to the redeveloped site can reside. This analysis should include
any evidence of discrimination in the relevant housing market. It
should also consider other evidence of a jurisdiction's actions that
limit housing opportunities for people of color, including development
plans that depend upon removal and displacement of low-income
communities of color. (Can a PGA Tour appropriate golf course and
a multi-million dollar movie studio exist in the sixth poorest city in
America?) Third, affirmatively furthering fair housing must include a
plan beyond merely issuing vouchers in light of an insufficient afforda-
ble housing stock and discriminatory rental practices against African
Americans in the housing market.
Dispersing and displacing low-income African Americans in the
name of fair housing is not what the Fair Housing Act stands for. To
think otherwise presupposes that the only way to promote the revitali-
zation of communities is if fewer African Americans, or people of
color, live in a neighborhood. While integration is one way to effectu-
ate fair housing, the government has operated as if it is the only way,
and as a result has undermined the core purpose of the Fair Housing
Act. To permit the wholesale removal of communities of color under
the guise of fair housing abdicates any governmental responsibility for
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ending structural racism. It permits the dispersal of families of color
as a quick fix, and ignores the more complex issues of markets and
governments that act inefficiently, and inequitably, in instances where
people of color are in the majority. Fair housing policies should not
be fashioned as a mandate to deconcentrate and "integrate" at all
costs, but must also include reform directed toward community devel-
opment in depressed, Black neighborhoods.
CONCLUSION
The fate of New Orleans' public housing after Hurricane Katrina
demonstrates that the integration imperative that has been read into
the Fair Housing Act must be revisited and revised. In this sense,
post-Katrina New Orleans provides an opportunity, but not in the
manner in which the government has pursued. It is an opportunity to
recapture the meaning of fair housing to include community restora-
tion, community enrichment, and spatial equality. If fair housing had
been understood to encompass these principles in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina, the fate of New Orleans' public housing would
have been very different. Instead of habitable housing left boarded
up and slated for demolition while a plan is devised to drastically re-
duce the number of public housing available in the city, units would
have been brought back online, families would have returned from
displacement, and social services and other community betterment ini-
tiatives would have been devised with the input and participation of
public housing residents.
The story of New Orleans public housing should be of concern to
all Americans. In the name of a disaster, should the government be
permitted to seize the moment to exclude those persons who are seen
in some quarters to be "unwanted?" Even more disconcerting, should
the goal of integration be used to dismantle communities of color and
their voting power, not only to move them elsewhere within their city
but to move them to other parts of the country altogether? The gov-
ernment's obligation to affirmatively further fair housing should en-
sure housing opportunities through mechanisms that are appropriate
to the circumstances. In the case of New Orleans, these powers were
used to deliver another blow to the families most devastated by Hurri-
cane Katrina.
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